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ENDURING EQUITY IN THE
CLOSE CORPORATION
LYMAN JOHNSON*
TOUT

DOIT CHANGER POUR QUE RIEN NE CHANGE1

INTRODUCTION
Much has changed since the summer of 1976—famously, the
nation’s Bicentennial, but also the date of Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc.,2 the focus of this Symposium. In mid-2010, for
example, South Africa was the site of a peaceful if exuberant World
Cup Soccer tournament,3 whereas in mid-1976, South African po
lice opened fire on crowds protesting the government’s harrowing
apartheid policies.4 Unemployment stood at 7.7% in 19765—higher
than usual, but not the August 2010, stubborn rate of 9.7%.6 The
* Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of
Law; LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis)
School of Law. The Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee University and
the University of St. Thomas provided financial support. John Jacob, Archivist at
Washington and Lee, provided extensive and invaluable archival assistance. Thomas
Berg, Nathan Johnson, Jeffrey Kahn, and Ann Massie gave the author helpful
information.
1. This French saying means “Everything must change so that nothing changes.”
This ironic historical maxim likely came from the French translation of the 1958 novel
THE LEOPARD by Giuseppe Di Lampedusa in which the character Tancredit declares,
“[s]i nouse voulons que tout resta tel que c’est, il faut que tout change.” GIUSEPPE DI
LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD (Feltrinelli 1958). It is less well-known than the phrase
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” (“The more things change, the more they
stay the same.”). ALPHONSE KARR, LES GUÊPES (1849). As argued in this Article, it is
equity’s remarkable adaptability that makes it so durable and well-suited to preserve
within the corporation—under constantly changing circumstances—the ongoing pursuit
of a just ordering. See infra Part IV.
2. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 657 (Mass. 1976).
3. George Vecsey, Celebrating South Africa and a Job Done Well, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/sports/soccer/11vecsey.html.
4. Milton Nkosi, Soweto 1976: A Schoolboy’s Memories, BBC NEWS, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5060278.stm (last updated June 13, 2006) (reciting the memories of Mr.
Nkosi, who, as a young boy, witnessed the events).
5. David S. Broder, Ford Asks $440 Billion Outlay, $47 Billion Deficit, WASH.
POST, Jan. 18, 1977, at A1.
6. Frank Ahrens, March Unemployment Unchanged at 9.7 Percent, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/02/AR201
0040201040.html.
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two-year Treasury note yielded 6.67%,7 not the August 2010 paltry
0.56%.8 The Dow-Jones Industrial average hovered around 1,000
in 1976,9 and in August of 2010 it flit around the 10,500 level.10
Stalwart Eastman Kodak loomed large in the camera business, in
troducing instant film photography in 1976; at times that year its
stock traded at over $100 per share,11 but as of August 2010 it
played a minor role in a much-altered digital industry, the stock
trading, on light volume, at around $4 per share.12 And, on the
international trade front, in 1976 the United States faced its great
est trade competition from Japan and Germany,13 whereas now
China is a more formidable economic rival.14
In the cultural arena, Rocky was the top-grossing film in
1976,15 with Toy Story 3 leading so far in 2010.16 Silly Love Songs
by Wings was the biggest hit song in 1976,17 but California Gurls by
7. Historical Data for the 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturities on an Annual Ba
sis, FED. RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Annual/H15_
TCMNOM_Y2.txt (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
8. Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.
treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-rate/yield.shtml (last vis
ited Nov. 19, 2010). This rate was as of August 27, 2010, the rate continues to fluctuate
slightly on a daily basis.
9. See Performance of Good Money & Dow Jones Industrial Averages (Since the
End of 1976), GOODMONEY.COM, www.goodmoney.com/gmiaraw.htm (last updated
Jan. 10, 2001) (showing the Dow Jones Industrial in 1976 at 1,004.65).
10. Dow Jones Industrial Average, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=^DJI&a=08&b=17&c=2010&d=08&e=17&f=2010&g=d (last visited Nov. 20,
2010) (showing the historical price as of September 17, 2010).
11. Vartanig G. Vartan, Eastman and Polaroid: The Profit Outlook, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1976, at 68; see also Eastman Kodak Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http:/
/finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=EK&a=00&b=1&c=1976&d=11&e=31&f=1976&g=d&z=66
&y=198 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
12. Dana Mattioli, Fresh Kodak Concerns Surface, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2010, at
B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039409045753948924
94087732.html.
13. See Edwin L. Dale, Jr., $906 Million Deficit in November Trade Sets Record
for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1976.
14. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33536, CHINA-U.S.
TRADE ISSUES, at 1-3 (2009), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
127016.pdf.
15. Tim Dirks, All-Time Top Box Office Hits (domestic) By Decade and Year,
FILMSITE, http://www.filmsite.org/boxoffice2.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
16. See id. (noting that Toy Story 3 has made the top ten list for the 2000’s); see
also 2010 Yearly Box Office Results, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://boxofficemojo.com/
yearly/chart/?yr=2010&p=.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 2010).
17. The BillBoard Hot 100 Songs of the Year (1970-1979), BILLBOARD.COM, http:/
/www.billboard.com/specials/hot100/charts/top50-no1s-70s.shtml (last visited Nov. 21,
2010).

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE203.txt

2011]

unknown

ENDURING EQUITY

Seq: 3

27-SEP-11

8:41

315

Katy Perry featuring Snoop Dogg, leads the pack so far in 2010.18
The top mid-70’s television show, All in the Family, is long gone,19
and today the CSI franchise holds sway.20 Disco dancing has disap
peared,21 and people now are “Dancing with the Stars.”22 Much
else in the realms of politics, economics, medicine, law, and socialcultural affairs also has changed over the years.
But much has not changed since 1976. The death penalty—
held by the U.S. Supreme Court not to violate the Eighth Amend
ment in 197623—remains in force in a majority of states.24 Tom
Watson was playing remarkable golf in 1976,25 and in 2010, at age
60, he still is.26 Bobby Knight, who coached Indiana to an NCAA
basketball championship in 1976,27 still offers acerbic if insightful
commentary on the game.28 Movie actors Sylvester Stallone
(Rocky—1976),29 Robert Redford (All the President’s Men—
1976),30 Clint Eastwood (The Enforcer—1976),31 and Jack Nichol
18. Hot 100, BILLBOARD.COM, http://www.billboard.com/charts/hot-100#/charts/
hot-100 (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
19. Top Ten 1970-1976, TVPARTY.COM, http://www.tvparty.com/70topten.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
20. CSI (franchise), WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CSI_(franchise)
(last modified Sept. 17, 2010).
21. Gaynor Borade, History of Disco Dance, BUZZLE.COM, http://www.buzzle.
com/articles/history-of-disco-dance.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
22. Gia Kourlas, Cheek to Cheek (and Tongue-In-Cheek), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2010, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/arts/dance/20stars.html.
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976).
24. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG 1, www.death
penaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Nov. 10, 2010).
25. Mr. Watson won the British Open in 1975 and 1977. Brent Kelley, Tom Wat
son, ABOUT.COM, http://golf.about.com/od/golfersmen/p/tom_watson.htm (last visited
Sept. 19, 2010). The Open is one of the four “major” tournaments in men’s golf. See id.
He also later won the U. S. Open and the Masters, each of which is a “major” tourna
ment. See id.
26. For example, Mr. Watson lost in a playoff at the 2009 British Open Champi
onship held in Turnberry Scotland. Id. It would have been his sixth Open victory. See
id.
27. Bob Knight: Former Indiana University Basketball Coach, INDYSTAR.COM,
http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/people/k/knight_bob/knight.html (last up
dated Feb. 4, 2008).
28. In Praise of Bobby Knight, STORMINGTHEFLOOR.NET, http://www.storming
thefloor.net/2009/12/in-praise-of-bobby-knight.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
29. Sylvester Stallone, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0000230 (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
30. Robert Redford, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://imdb.com/name/
nm/0000602/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
31. Clint Eastwood, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://imdb.com/name/
nm/0000142/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
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son (One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest—1976, Best Picture)32 all
remain active in the movie industry. Musically, Elton John (Don’t
Go Breaking My Heart—1976)33 and Paul Simon (50 Ways to Leave
Your Lover and Still Crazy After All These Years—1976)34 remain
on tour. Steve Jobs co-founded Apple Computer in 1976 (on April
Fools’ Day),35 and still regularly produces innovative products,36
while Microsoft (trademarked in 1976 and led for decades by Bill
Gates, who left Harvard in 1976 to go full time at the company he
co-founded) remains a formidable force in the software world.37
Many other high-profile features and people from 1976 also are still
part of the social landscape today.
This commemorative reflection on Wilkes will develop this
theme of change/sameness in connection with equity—the source of
the fiduciary duties which stood, as they often do in close corpora
tions, as the centerpiece in Wilkes. Equity’s role in the Western
legal tradition began, of course, long before Wilkes, and it endures
today in the law of close corporations precisely because, ironically,
it is so adaptable. Parts I, II, and III will sketch the larger milieu of
the Wilkes case, where details about place, industry, and company
are rich in their historic particulars but where too endless change is
at work in the perennial quest for survival. Part I describes the city,
Pittsfield, Massachusetts where the focal point of litigation—Spr
ingside Nursing Home, Inc. (Springside)—was located. Part II tells
a bit about the key industry in the case, nursing homes, from the
early 1950s to the mid-1970s—the period spanning the company’s
origins to the Supreme Court decision in Wilkes. Part III highlights
a few noteworthy, but little noted, facts about Springside itself.
Part IV hones in on the dispute between Stanley Wilkes and his
fellow shareholders in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., and
on how the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in resolving that
dispute, re-fashioned the equitable concerns animating the
32. Jack Nicoholson , WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_nicholson
(last modified Aug. 20, 2010).
33. Elton John: Don’t Go Breaking My Heart, LAST.FM, http://www.last.fm/music/
Elton+John/_/Don’t+Go+Breaking+My+Heart (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
34. Paul Simon, PBS.ORG (Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/american
masters/episodes/paul-simon/about-paul-simon/705/.
35. Steve Wozniack, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Wozniak
(last modified Sept. 13, 2010).
36. Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc (last
modified Sept. 19, 2010).
37. Bill Gates, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_Gates (last mod
ified Sept. 19, 2010).
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landmark Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company 38 decision. Part
IV also places the Wilkes decision in a broader legal context—
where it is seen as no aberration—and elaborates on how and why,
in 2011, equity endures, by taking account of the inevitable flux in
business relations in a way which static law does not. Equity en
dures even as it continually eludes law’s attempted subduing by
rules, with the result that equity itself must still be endured by those
involved in close corporations.
I. THE PLACE
Springside, a corporation formed under Massachusetts law,
was located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, the county seat of Berk
shire County.39 Named after William Pitt, today the city’s popula
tion of 42, 642 is down from the 51,974 of the 1980 census, and it is
about back to where it stood in 1920.40 Due to the many streams
flowing into the nearby Housatonic River, numerous lumber, pa
per, and textile mills dotted the landscape around Pittsfield, and for
a significant part of the 19th century, that “area [was] the center of
woolen manufacturing in the United States.”41 Today, those indus
tries are gone, and although Pittsfield’s economy still has some
manufacturing enterprises,42 far more people are employed in edu
cation and health services, leisure and hospitality, and in the public
sector.43 The city also has been a place of residence for several fa
mous writers, including Herman Melville, who wrote Moby Dick
while living in Pittsfield;44 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Edith
Wharton, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose family had vast land
38. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
39. Things to Do & Places to Stay in the Berkshires: Pittsfield, Mass. BERKSHIRE
LINKS.COM, http://www.berkshirelinks.com/pittsfield-ma/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
40. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE POPULATION: NUMBER OF INHABITANTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 23-10 (1980), availa
ble at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980a_maABC-01.pdf; Pitts
field, MA Profile, IDCIDE.COM, http://www.idcide.com/citydata/ma/pittsfield.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2011); Pittsfield, Massachusetts, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Pittsfield,_Massachusetts#NotableResidents (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
41. Id.
42. See Pittsfield, Massachusetts (MA): Accommodation, Waste Management,
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation, etc.—Economy and Business Data & Market Re
search, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/business/econ-Pittsfield-Massachu
setts.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
43. See Economy at a Glance: Pittsfield, MA, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ma_pittsfield_mn.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
44. Herman Melville and Arrowhead, BERKSHIRE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://
berkshirehistory.org/herman-melville/herman-melville-and-arrowhead/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2010).
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holdings in Pittsfield and whose son, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
served on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for two de
cades before becoming a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court in
1902.45
Like the path-breaking legal duo of Donahue and Wilkes,
Pittsfield itself is associated with several “firsts.” William Craig was
the first Secret Service agent killed on a presidential protection de
tail as he accompanied President Theodore Roosevelt on a trip to
Pittsfield.46 Mr. Craig was thrown to the street when the barouche
carrying President Roosevelt collided head-on with a trolley.47
Roosevelt’s face was badly bruised, and ever the pugilist, he nearly
came to blows with the trolley’s motorman, who later pled guilty to
manslaughter.48 The first electric transformer was produced in
Pittsfield by William Stanley, whose Electric Manufacturing Com
pany was a forerunner to General Electric.49 In the first ever inter
collegiate baseball game—held in Pittsfield in 1859 and played
under the more wide-open, but soon-abandoned, “Massachusetts
rules”—Amherst defeated Williams in twenty-five innings and by
the astounding score of 73-32.50 In addition, Colonel John Brown
of Pittsfield, was, during the Revolutionary War, the first to accuse
Benedict Arnold of treachery;51 Pittsfield resident William Allen
wrote An American Biographical and Historical Dictionary and was
President of Dartmouth at the time of the famous Supreme Court
45. Pittsfield, Massachusetts, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Pittsfield,_Massachusetts#NotableResidents (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). Holmes, Jr.
served as both an Associate Justice and, later, as the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. Michael A. Carrier, Note, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1894, 1902-03
(1995) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND
THE INNER SELF (1993)).
46. Press Release, United States Secret Serv., United States Secret Serv. Honors
First Operative Killed in The Line of Duty (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.
secretservice.gov/press/pub2002.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Clarence Fanto, Pittsfield: The City is on a Major Upswing Despite Recent
Setbacks, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE, June 5, 2007, http://www.berkshireeagle.com/search/
ci_6063023?IADID=search-www.berkshireeagle.com-www.be.
49. History of Pittsfield, CITY OF PITTSFIELD, http://www.pittsfield-ma.org/about_
pittsfield/history_of_pittsfield.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
50. One hundred fiftieth anniversary of first college baseball game—Williams vs.
Amherst to air LIVE on ESPN360 from Pittsfield’s Wahconah Park and on tape delay
on ESPN U May 4, 6 and 13, WILLIAMS ATHLETICS (Apr. 7, 2009), http://athletics.
williams.edu/sports/bsb/2008-09/news/0407_150th_anniversary_of_1st_college_baseball_
game_—_Williams_vs._Amherst_to_air_on_ESPNU_from_Pittsfield-s_Wahconah_
Park.
51. Robert L. French, Colonel John Brown 1744-1780, THREE RIVERS (2003),
http://www.fortklock.com/coloneljbrown.htm.
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case;52 and department store magnate Marshall Field took his first
paying job as an “errand boy” in Pittsfield.53
With its stolid but interesting history, Pittsfield was an apt set
ting for what surely started out as just another prosaic lawsuit, in
volving a typical business dispute, which went on, nonetheless, to
generate considerable, if niched, notoriety. Unlike Pittsfield’s other
encounters with famous firsts,54 the Wilkes ruling in 197655 may
have gone unnoticed by, and may be still largely unknown to, the
local populace—the case drew no comment in the Berkshire Eagle
newspaper, much less the August Boston Globe 56 —even though its
enduring influence may be far greater than those “firsts” elsewhere
touted by Pittsfield’s boosters.
II. THE INDUSTRY
The four original partner-shareholders in Springside showed
remarkable entrepreneurial vision, or enjoyed extremely good for
tune, in entering the nursing home business in the early 1950s. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion spends little time on
this, observing only that, with respect to a certain real estate parcel,
“the parties later determined that the property would have its
greatest potential for profit if it were operated by them as a nursing
home.”57 We see change in the parties’ thinking, it is obvious, from
the very outset.
The post-World War II period was a time of considerable
growth in the nursing home business.58 This resulted from, among
other factors, shifting cultural attitudes about proper care for the
elderly and increased availability of federal payments for construc
tion of nursing homes “in conjunction with existing facilities,”
which were approved in the 1954 Medical Facilities Survey and
Construction Act in an effort to improve the overall quality of elder
52. Guide to the Papers of William Allen, 1800-1856, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., http:/
/ead.dartmouth.edu/html/ms916_fullguide.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011); see Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 5184 (1819).
53. Marshall Field, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/206204/Marshall-Field (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
54. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
55. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
56. Electronic searches of the digitized Berkshire Eagle (through Ancestry.com)
and the Boston Globe (via Factiva.com) produced no results.
57. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
58. BRADFORD H. GRAY, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 496-98
(1986).

R
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care.59 Passage of the Kerr-Mills Provisions in 1960, moreover, au
thorized medical assistance payments to poorer residents of nursing
homes,60 though many states did not participate in that voluntary
program.61 Still, the real growth lay ahead, given that of all money
appropriated by Congress for construction of various facilities in
1954, only $4 million was allotted for nursing homes.62
The real growth in the nursing home industry occurred in the
1960s.63 Due to the availability of Medicare and Medicaid pay
ments to nursing homes beginning in the mid-1960s, by the mid
1970s the nursing home industry had experienced a dramatic up
surge, with overall nursing home expenditures increasing 1,400%
between 1960 and 1974.64 President Gerald Ford, in May 1976,
even called for the observance of National Nursing Home Week.65
Sixteen thousand homes were generating $4.7 billion in annual rev
enue by the mid-70s.66 Three-quarters of the private nursing homes
in the mid-1970s were operated on a for-profit basis, with approxi
mately two-thirds of total industry revenue coming from govern
ment sources.67 Moreover, by the mid-1970s, much of the industry
was organized with the same separation between ownership and
management as seen in other businesses,68 as larger care-providers
increasingly were drawn to the attractive profit opportunities the
industry offered.69 It was also during this high-growth period, how
ever, and notwithstanding extensive regulation, that the nursing
home industry was famously associated with chilling tales of patient
neglect and abuse, corruption, and rampant Medicaid fraud.70 It
59. Medical Facilities Survey and Construction Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-482,
68 Stat. 461 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291b, 291c, 291g, to 291j, 291m,
291o to 291 o-1 (2006)).
60. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 987 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (2006)).
61. JAMES MIDGLEY & MICHELLE LIVERMORE, THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL POL
ICY 384-85 (2d ed. Sage Publications, Inc. 2009).
62. Tabulation Made of Nursing Homes, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1955, at 78.
63. GRAY, supra note 58, at 497.
64. David Shulman & Ruth Galanter, Reorganizing the Nursing Home Industry:
A Proposal, 54 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND. Q. 129, 130 (1976).
65. Gerald Ford, Message on the Observance of National Nursing Home Week,
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
5993 (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
66. Shulman & Galanter, supra note 64, at 130.
67. Id. at 130-31.
68. Id. at 130.
69. Id.
70. Nursing Home Report: Things Are Still Bad, N. Y. TIMES, May 23, 1976, at E5;
Nursing-Home Head Is Indicted In Fraud, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1976, at 98.

R
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should be emphasized, however, that nothing in the Wilkes opinion
suggests that the Springside Nursing Home was afflicted with these
problems.
The industry was quite capital intensive, not because of large
expenditures for capital equipment, but due to extensive invest
ment in improved real estate.71 This investment was encouraged by
government reimbursement formulas, which included a percentage
return on invested capital.72 For example, a 1976 study of the nurs
ing home industry drawing on data obtained from public company
reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, reveals
that due to large depreciation charges affording tax shelters, a typi
cal nursing home bed yielded an enviable 29% rate of cash flow
return on investment.73
Mr. Wilkes, with a judicially-noticed reputation for profitable
dealings in real estate,74 would have clearly understood deprecia
tion charges, tax shelters, and cash flow. Financially, the nursing
home business generated a steady, government-provided revenue
stream; government-sanctioned depreciation charges; and high, de
pendable cash flow returns, all in a stable growth industry.75 For
any shareholder to abruptly lose a longstanding stream of income
from any corporation is a financial setback. For a real estate and
cash-flow-savvy investor like Wilkes, it altered fundamentally the
very raison d’être for investing in a nursing home company like Spr
ingside in the first place.
III. THE CORPORATION
In 1951, Mr. Wilkes acquired an option to purchase a lot and
building on the corner of Springside Avenue and North Street in
Pittsfield.76 The property had previously housed the Hillcrest Hos
71. Shulman & Galanter, supra note 64, at 134.
72. Id. at 137.
73. Id.
74. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976).
Mr. Wilkes apparently continued to invest in Pittsfield real estate even after he became
involved in Springside. See Wilkes Buys Berkshire City Land at Auction, THE BERK
SHIRE EAGLE, Aug. 13, 1965, at 15.
75. See 4 ALAN M. GARBER, FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 78 (The
MIT Press 2001) (“In 1960, public expenditure on long-term care in the United States
accounted for only 2 percent of health care spending, but in 1996 it accounted for 10
percent.”).
76. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
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pital.77 Mr. Wilkes was said to be “principally engaged in the roof
ing and siding business” but he also had a local reputation for
“profitable dealings in real estate.”78 To be accurate, Mr. Wilkes
had started his roofing business in 1939, when he was thirty-three
years old, and in 1972, when he was sixty-six, he sold it and went
into the siding business.79 He was forty-five when he bought the
Springside Avenue option in 1951.80 Wilkes brought in three other
investors—Riche, Quinn, and Pipkin—and the four of them ini
tially purchased the building and lot “as a real estate investment
which, they believed, had good profit potential on resale or
rental.”81 Initially, Wilkes may have seen this as yet another oppor
tunity for his “profitable dealings in real estate.”82
Later the four men decided “the property would have its great
est potential for profit . . . as a nursing home.”83 Whether visionary
or simply fortunate, in retrospect this was a wise move, given how
rapidly the nursing home industry grew in the 1950s and, especially,
in the 1960s.84 The decision to operate a nursing home on the lot
the four gentlemen acquired must have happened fairly quickly be
cause a Berkshire Eagle newspaper article reports that Springside
opened its first nursing home in October 1951,85 the same year the
property was purchased.86 Springside opened a second home in
late 1952 and a third home in February of 1957, when it bought and
renovated property previously owned by the Pittsfield Anti-Tuber
culosis Association.87 The third home had especially impressive
and up-to-date fire-alarm, sprinkler, and back-up power systems.88
Once the third home had opened, the company reportedly was the
largest privately-owned nursing home operator in Massachusetts.89
The Wilkes opinion reports that Wilkes consulted his attorney
about the new business, and that his attorney suggested they form a
77. Open House Tomorrow at Nursing Home, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Feb. 9,
1957, at 6.
78. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
79. Obituary, Stanley J. Wilkes, Ex-President of Berkshire Roofing, BERKSHIRE
EAGLE, Apr. 30, 1981, at 17.
80. Id.
81. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra Part II.
85. Open House Tomorrow at Nursing Home, supra note 77, at 6.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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corporation rather than a partnership, largely to avoid personal lia
bility for business debts.90 The other three investors concurred.91 It
appears, however, that the business was operated for at least some
period as a partnership prior to being incorporated, a fact that
would shape Wilkes’s initial legal strategy.92 This background fact
in Wilkes certainly confirms the observation made a year earlier in
Donahue that many close corporations are, essentially, “little more
than incorporated . . . partnerships.”93
The newly formed Massachusetts corporation, Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., owned and operated all aspects of the nursing
home business, and each of the four men became a twenty-five per
cent shareholder.94 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
opinion emphasized that certain original “understandings” existed
among the parties,95 but, apparently, Wilkes’s attorney did not ad
vocate a written shareholders’ agreement to protect his client or
any of the other shareholders.96 Consequently, the parties evi
dently relied on these spoken but unmemorialized understandings.
This may reveal poor legal counsel, or client naı̈veté, but it also
indicates a certain level of trust; this trust was understandable on
Wilkes’s part given that all three co-investors already were known
to him at the time of the investment and were described by the
court as his acquaintances.97 This background fact likewise con
firms the insightful observation in Donahue that, in close corpora
tions, the participants necessarily “rely on the fidelity and abilities
of those stockholders who hold office.”98
The mutual understandings of the participants in Wilkes were
straightforward and quite typical of those arising from a close cor
poration. Each shareholder would be a director, would actively
participate in management and decision-making concerning com
pany operations, and “each would [, in turn,] receive money from
the corporation in equal amounts.”99 No federal income tax “S”
election, permitting avoidance of tax at the corporate level, was in
effect. Thus, salaries reduced corporate income subject to taxation.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976).
Id.
See id.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975).
Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
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Wilkes, also by understanding, served as treasurer of the business
from 1951 until 1967.100 And so it went, as planned and under
stood, for many years. By 1955, only the fourth full year of opera
tion, each shareholder was receiving $100 per week, amounting to
$5,200 per year.101 The median income for men in the United
States in 1955 was only $3,400 per year.102 And only 23.7% of all
men earned over $5,000 per year.103 Consequently, payments re
ceived from the corporation alone—excluding all other sources of
income—placed each Springside shareholder in the top quartile of
all male wage earners in 1955.
Moreover, it should be recalled that Wilkes was “principally
engaged” in the roofing business.104 Thus, his non-primary business
activity—the nursing home business—was providing him at age
forty-nine with annual income more than 50% above the median
level of income for all men in 1955. For some unexplained reason,
the weekly payouts did not increase over the next twelve years but
remained at $100 per week in 1967, the year trouble broke out.105
Even in 1967, however, the mean income for all men was only
about $8,100.106 Moreover, for people between the ages of 55 and
64—Wilkes was 61 in 1967—the median income was only around
$7,000.107 Thus, Wilkes’s non-primary business activity—the nurs
ing home business—still was providing a very handsome financial
return, on a relative basis, even though roofing was his chief occu
pation, and even though corporate payouts had not increased for
many years. Furthermore, assuming the business was flourishing—
and certainly the period from the mid-1950s through the 1960s was
a profitable time for the nursing home industry generally—given
the flat annual payout ratio and bright industry prospects with new
Medicare and Medicaid payments, the value of the stock itself must
have been appreciating considerably.
It was Wilkes’s announcement in early 1967 of his intention to
sell his stock that brought to the surface some simmering bad
100. Id. at 660 n.9.
101. Id. at 660.
102. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA
TION REPORT—CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, No. 21 (May, 1956).
103. Id.
104. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
105. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
106. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA
TION REPORTS—CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, No. 57 (Dec. 17, 1968).
107. Id.
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blood,108 and afforded the other investors an opportune way to put
the “squeeze” on Wilkes.109
The falling out among shareholders is well if tersely described
in the Wilkes opinion.110 The upshot was that, just as Wilkes in
early 1967 sought to exit and “cash out” of Springside after sixteen
years, he was cut off by the other three director-investors from all
salary payments and was removed as an employee, officer, and di
rector.111 The discord had its origins in Wilkes’s insistence in 1965
that co-shareholder Quinn pay a higher price for certain Springside
property Quinn wished to purchase for himself.112 Wilkes’s fidelity
to the corporation apparently annoyed Quinn and led to a deterio
ration in their relationship.113 Eventually, two intra-corporate fac
tions formed: Wilkes versus the other three investors.114 There
were no allegations or findings of misconduct, neglect, or unwilling
ness to work on Wilkes’s part.115 Wilkes, a minority shareholder,
was being “frozen out” of the venture he initiated, a venture de
signed—like his early real estate dealings and like all investments in
the nursing home industry—to generate high, dependable cash
flow.116 In fact, the manner of freezing out Wilkes was far more in
line with the typical corporate freeze-out than the unequal purchase
and sale of stock technique deployed in Donahue,117 oppressive as
that technique was. This was important in situating the Wilkes facts
well within the ambit of customary concern in close corporations, a
concern that was so expansively—perhaps too expansively—identi
fied in Donahue.118
IV.

THE DECISION

Although cut off from all corporate payments in early 1967,
Wilkes did not start a lawsuit until August 1971, more than four
108. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660.
109. Id. at 664 n.14 (the court drew the sensible inference of a plan to squeeze
Wilkes based on Mr. Connor’s “offer to purchase Wilkes’s [stock] for a price Connor
. . . would not have accepted for his own shares”).
110. Id. at 660-61.
111. Id. at 661.
112. Id. at 660.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 660-61.
115. Id. at 661.
116. Id. For an apt definition of a “freeze out,” see Donahue v. Rodd Elec
trotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-515 (Mass. 1975).
117. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14.
118. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513-15.
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years later.119 In the author’s experience, this delay is not uncom
mon, as a disgruntled shareholder often tries and expects (or hopes)
to reach an acceptable resolution before suing. Moreover, it is only
when the shareholder has been “cut off” for two or more years that
one can truly conclude he has experienced a “pattern” of being shut
out of corporate distributions.
Wilkes engaged an out-of-town lawyer, James F. Egan, from
Springfield, who later engaged another Springfield lawyer David J.
Martel (Wilkes’s nephew), to assist in the appeal to the Supreme
Judicial Court.120 He filed a “bill in equity” in Probate Court for
Berkshire County and named as defendants the corporation itself,
two of his fellow shareholders, and the executors of the deceased
third shareholder.121 His initial theory for relief was breach of a
1951 oral partnership agreement.122 Relying on a master’s report—
which essentially found what Wilkes had alleged—the probate
judge nonetheless dismissed the case in 1974,123 the year before the
seminal Donahue decision.124 Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted direct appellate review of the Wilkes dismissal in late
1974,125 just before the Donahue decision itself, which was issued
on May 2, 1975.126 Thus, as it deliberated over the Wilkes case, the
court had Donahue fresh in its mind. It seems unlikely that a direct
appeal would be granted if the court saw the case as involving only
a breach of partnership agreement, the theory below. Justice Wil
kins’s very terse concurrence in Donahue was remarkably prescient
in light of the Wilkes appeal because he refrained from joining in
any implication in the majority opinion that the court’s reasoning
“applies to all operations of the corporation as they affect minority
stockholders. That broader issue, which is apt to arise in connec
119. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59.
120. Id. at 658. The author thanks Mr. Martel for describing when he got in
volved in the litigation and his relationship to Mr. Wilkes. David J. Martel, Esq.,
Speech at the Western New England College School of Law Business Symposium: Fidu
ciary Duties in Closely Held Business 35 Years after Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc. (Oct. 15, 2010).
121. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 659.
124. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 505 (Mass. 1975).
125. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659. Under Rule 11 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Appellate Procedure, direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court may be granted on
the vote of two justices where, among other grounds, a question of first impression or a
novel question of law is presented. MASS. R. APP. P. 11; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
211A, § 10 (2008).
126. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505.
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tion with salaries and dividend policy, is not involved in this case.
The analogy to partnerships may not be a complete one.”127 It was
more than “apt” to arise; it had already arisen, and would soon be
before the court, in the Wilkes appeal. Sense can be made of this
concurrence when one sees that, for some reason, Justice Wilkins
did not subsequently participate in the Wilkes opinion—although
he was still on the court—and thus his concurrence in Donahue ap
parently was his only opportunity to express at least some misgiv
ings about how to resolve the upcoming Wilkes appeal in light of
Donahue.
Having taken the Wilkes appeal in October 1974, the court did
not rule until August 1976,128 suggesting the court was struggling to
craft its ruling. Donahue was also slow to be decided, taking four
teen months after the ruling in the appeals court.129 Moreover, on
appeal, and in light of the fact that Donahue had been decided
since Wilkes had taken his appeal, Wilkes added a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty owed him by the majority shareholders.130 The
court permitted the additional theory, a deviation from standard
appellate practice, but understandable in light of the intervening
and momentous decision in Donahue.131 The court—now led by a
new Chief Justice (Hennessey), former Chief Justice Tauro having
retired after Donahue 132 —made short shrift of Justice Wilkins’s
hesitancy in his Donahue concurrence to automatically apply part
nership law analogies in all close corporation settings.133 The court
concluded that it was not vital to its decision whether Wilkes’s claim
was governed by partnership law or corporate law because Donahue had held that shareholders in close corporations owe one an
other substantially the same duties partners owe each other.134 The
Wilkes court, in other words, was not carving back the Donahue
partnership analogy—the court described the factual differences
127. Id. at 521 (Wilkins, J. concurring).
128. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 657.
129. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 307 N.E.2d 8, 8-9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974),
rev’d, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s dismis
sal of Donahue’s claim on February 20, 1974. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court decision
came down on May 2, 1975. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505.
130. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659.
131. Id.
132. Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAS
SACHUSETTS, http://www.massreports.com/justices/alljustices.aspx (last visited Apr. 23,
2011).
133. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
134. Id. at 662.
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between the two cases as “more of form than of substance”135—
though it did, as is well-known, reconfigure Donahue in another
key fashion described below.
Wilkes, because he had never been “principally” employed by
Springside,136 was not the typical shareholder-employee who, in be
ing terminated as an employee, loses his chief source of wage in
come. Thus, the court could not, with respect to Wilkes, over
emphasize the “job guarantee” or employment aspect of a minority
shareholder’s investment in a close corporation.137 Instead, the
court, besides mentioning Wilkes’s loss of “participation in the
management of the enterprise,”138 shrewdly and neutrally phrased
a longstanding salary payment to Wilkes as being “the principal re
turn on his investment” and its curtailment as denying Wilkes “an
equal return on his investment.”139 That perceptively hit the finan
cial nail on the head for Wilkes himself, specifically, as an inveter
ate real estate investor and for investors generally in the nursing
home industry, where, as noted earlier, regular cash flow is a chief
investment goal.140
The larger human narrative in the Wilkes opinion was one of
betrayal and dashed expectations among longtime colleagues. This
theme played out in the usual way in a close corporation after “bad
blood” between Wilkes and Quinn grew into majority and minority
factionalism.141 Although none of the parties is fully sketched in
the opinion, Wilkes is fleshed out in somewhat fuller humanity than
are the defendants.142 As to the defendants, relatively little is said,
with more attention given to their role as—controlling sharehold
ers—in the morality play of corporate dissension and the specific
actions they took in that role.143 Even in that archetypal capacity,
neither the defendants nor the court had much to say in their
defense.
In keeping with the tenor of the times, the Wilkes opinion was
doctrinal, though it drew heavily on scholarship detailing the plight
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
dan, 857
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 663.
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 662-63. These were Wilkes’s “reasonable expectations.” Brodie v. Jor
N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (Mass. 2006); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
See supra notes 73-75, 115-118 and accompanying text.
See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660-61.
See id.
See id. at 663-64.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE203.txt

2011]

unknown

ENDURING EQUITY

Seq: 17

27-SEP-11

8:41

329

of a minority shareholder.144 There was no evident “law and eco
nomics” influence on the opinion—landmark works in that vein by
Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner were very recent145—and cor
porate law itself was several years away from being systematically
examined from an economics perspective.146 The opinion also was
not empirical or multidisciplinary in orientation.
The enduring and memorable heart of Wilkes, of course, is the
way in which it sought to rein in a potentially over-broad reading of
Donahue’s imposition of partnership-like fiduciary duties on con
trolling shareholders. The court stressed the need for a “balanced”
approach to the legitimate control rights of the majority, on the one
hand, with the rightful concerns of the minority, on the other
hand.147 Balancing, of course, is a longstanding mainstay of consti
tutional law analysis, where competing interests are weighed
against each other and the relative strengths of each are assessed.148
Its use can be seen, for example, in dormant commerce clause anal
ysis,149 due process review,150 outlining abortion rights,151 and in
evaluating (and upholding) a law criminalizing the distribution of
child pornography.152 All of these knotty issues—and others like
them—require courts to measure the rival interests and determine
which, on balance, carries the greater weight. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court itself had used a balancing approach in con
144. Id. at 663. This theme is developed more fully in the articles for this sympo
sium by Professors Loewenstein and Thompson. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: A Historical Perspective, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339
(2011); Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011).
145. See, RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
Michael Jensen’s and William Meckling’s pathbreaking work on a theory of the firm
appeared in 1976. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
146. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L. J. 698 (1982) (analysis of the economic benefits of freezing
out a shareholder in a closely held corporation); Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and Eco
nomics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981) (critique of an analysis of the
effect of dividends on share prices).
147. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
148. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L. J. 943, 943-44 (1987).
149. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970).
150. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
151. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-57 (1973).
152. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
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stitutional law cases before Wilkes.153 Thus, as a decision-making
methodology, the Wilkes approach was drawing on deep and estab
lished precedent.
Wilkes’s balancing approach was fitting, but paradoxical. In
constitutional law the pivotal issue in balancing is how to reconcile
individual rights with governmental interests, the latter typically be
ing embodied in legislatively-enacted, majority-supported stat
utes.154 Indeed, the first ten amendments to the U.S.
Constitution—the Bill of Rights—and their subsequent incorpora
tion via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, are
designed to protect individual interests against the lawfully-exer
cised power of a political majority.155 The Donahue opinion, by
analogy, struck a protective “bill of rights” blow for minority inter
ests in close corporations gave little heed to the rightful claims of
the majority interests acting in accordance with the corporate stat
ute’s “constitutional” power structure.156 Wilkes sought to restore
the potential imbalance of Donahue by acknowledging the “selfish
ownership” rights of the controlling group.157 Rather than the
usual constitutional law concern for the individual in relation to the
potentially tyrannical majority, therefore, Wilkes set forth a “re
verse bill of rights” to recognize the legitimate concerns and prerog
atives of the duly-constituted majority.
Such a case-by-case balancing approach inevitably is messy,
context specific, and often lacking in ex ante predictability.158 In
the constitutional law area, balancing has been severely criticized
for just these reasons, as well as for the broad discretion it accords
judges.159 Consequently, in the governance of a close corporation,
as in a constitutionally-democratic government, frequently there
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Horne, 291 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1973); Common
wealth v. Thomas, 233 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. 1967).
154. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Rod
riguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1991); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 804 N.E.2d
885 (Mass. 2004).
155. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3021 (2010) (holding
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
156. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-14 (Mass. 1975).
157. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
158. Some balancing tests are not case-by-case but are more systemic in thrust.
See Legal Theory Lexicon 024: Balancing Tests, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, http://
lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_1.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
159. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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arises an unavoidable and recurrent clash. This clash is not just be
tween minority expectations and majority prerogatives, but also
over views as to how best, jurisprudentially, to address that clash.
Some favor the case-by-case approach, notwithstanding its messy,
time-consuming, and somewhat indeterminate nature, on the
grounds that it promotes more finely-tailored overall fairness.160
Others prefer a more categorical approach in which, in corporations
at least, minority shareholders must self-help ex ante by private bar
gaining or are left out in the cold when trouble erupts, because such
an approach promotes greater certainty of outcome and somewhat
disempowers the judiciary.161 This clash of positions presents a
stark antinomy in which a true harmonization of views is, ulti
mately, impossible to attain.
Of course the jurisprudential vessel for “unsettling” corporate
law and its statutorily-enacted majoritarian regime is equity. Eq
uity—and its offspring, fiduciary duties162—by their very nature
subvert and destabilize law.163 The problem with legal precepts,
identified so clearly by Aristotle, is their universality.164 Although
generally the categorical nature of law is desirable, so that even
handedness is attained, in some settings to apply a legal rule blindly
will itself create a manifest injustice and it is equity’s essential func
tion to prevent that.165 Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence long
has recognized this role in numerous settings.166 For example, with
respect to the improper use of statutory power to amend bylaws to
160. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse In
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 41 (2002).
161. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, supra note 146, at 700-703.
162. McMahon v. New Castle Assoc., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“Chan
cery takes jurisdiction over ‘fiduciary’ relationships because equity, not law, is the
source of the right asserted.”).
163. MARGARET HALLIWELL, EQUITY & GOOD CONSCIENCE IN A CONTEMPO
RARY CONTEXT 6 (1997) (“Fundamental misconceptions of equity abound, . . . because
of a persistent refusal to acknowledge that equity is, by its very nature, subversive of the
law.”).
164. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 142 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Mer
rill Co., Inc., 1962). “[E]very law is necessarily universal while there are some things
which it is not possible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement . . . [t]he
law takes the generality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved.” Id.
165. See HALLIWELL, supra note 163, at 6 (explaining that equity occasionally
“subverts” law to correct a potential injustice caused by law’s inherent universality).
166. Davenport Servs., Inc. v. Five North Corp., No. 01L-04-101, 2003 WL
21739066, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct., May 19, 2003) (“The Court of Chancery is a court of
‘limited jurisdiction’ that decides matters in equity; its jurisdiction was first defined by
the jurisdiction of the English High Court of Chancery in 1776.”); see also Prod. Res.
Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 801 (Del. Ch. 2009); Carney v. Preston,
683 A.2d 47, n.4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006).
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thwart a minority shareholder in the landmark case of Schnell v.
Chris Craft Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court stated
that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply be
cause it is legally possible.”167 And Delaware courts also have held
that otherwise lawful corporate contracts are invalid if entering
them constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.168 In other words, eq
uity, in certain circumstances, routinely intervenes into law-comply
ing arrangements to correct injustice by imposing fiduciary duties
on a control person or group and by constraining an inequitable
exercise of power. Although equity usefully meliorates the poten
tial unfairness of law’s categorical rules in this way, it can, nonethe
less, seem disturbingly amorphous with no clearly-delineated limits.
This was one of the post-Donahue concerns that required attention
in Wilkes.
The perennial temptation, of course, is for law, initially hob
bled by equity, to counteract equity’s foray by turning its very inter
ventions back into more orderly “rules of law.” Aristotle cautioned
against this understandable but faulty desire for an illusory cer
tainty by stating: “The rule of the undefined must itself remain un
defined also.”169 Along this line, Wilkes valiantly tried to corral
somewhat the equitable forces unleashed in Donahue through Don
ahue’s broad holding that shareholders in a close corporation owe
one another a strict fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loy
alty.170 At the same time that Donahue articulated this broad duty,
it went on in utter tension therewith to mandate a “rule of equal
opportunity,”171 apparently not appreciating the inherent differ
ences and functions between “standards” and “rules.”172
Wilkes sought to cabin the broad duty laid out in Donahue—
without also reverting to the trap of “rule talk”—through a struc
tured four-step framework.173 First, the plaintiff minority-share
167. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
168. In re Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litigation, 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del.
1993).
169. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 164.
170. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-62 (Mass.
1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517-18 (Mass. 1975).
171. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519 (emphasis added). An early comment on Don
ahue noted what the author called “a rule of equality in the stock purchase area.”
Michael B. Elefante, Corporations, 23 ANN. SURV. MASS. L. 264, 269 (1976).
172. For a contrasting of standards and rules in corporate law, see Lyman P. Q.
Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1194-95 (2004). See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
173. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (describing the four-step framework).
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holder has an initial burden to plead a breach of fiduciary duty.174
Second, the defendant control group then must demonstrate a legit
imate business purpose.175 Third, the plaintiff must prove that the
same objective could have been achieved by an alternative course
less harmful to the minority.176 Finally, taking a balancing ap
proach, the court weighs the strengths of the two sides and settles
the dispute.177 This methodology seeks to bring order to the analyt
ical and adjudicative process, but in the age-old law vs. equity tug of
war it cannot—nor does it seek to—ultimately subdue the ever-un
ruly equity by crafting universal “rules” of law. In keeping with
that approach, at the end of its opinion, the Wilkes court summed
up that Mr. Wilkes—who, recall, had brought his suit as a bill in
equity—was to be awarded such damages as a result of the “inequi
table enrichment” of the majority.178
The ongoing, but futile, Sisyphus-like effort in corporate law to
counter the disruptive effects of equity by turning equity into the
very rule-oriented approach it is designed to resist can be seen not
just in Donahue but in other areas of corporate law. For example,
self-dealing transactions by directors or controlling shareholders
long have been closely scrutinized by courts.179 In an effort to bring
a measure of legal predictability to these transactions, many
states—including Massachusetts and Delaware—have enacted stat
utes addressing director conflict of interest transactions.180 Yet,
these statutes, in Delaware at least,181 and seemingly in Massachu
setts as well,182 have been interpreted as permitting avoidance of a
transaction’s voidability but not as preventing a court from review
ing the matter ex post for compliance with fiduciary duties. Equity
will not altogether quit the field here.
Even the seemingly awkward multi-step framework laid out in
Wilkes has considerable company in corporate law.183 The aim, re
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 665.
179. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596-603
(1921).
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156 D, § 8.31 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144
(2001).
181. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders’ Litigation, 879 A.2d 604, 614-15
(Del. Ch. 2005).
182. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156 D, § 8.31 preliminary note 1.
183. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 246-51 (Harvard University Press 1991).
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call, is to guide the equitable inquiry without vainly trying to reduce
it to rule-like status.184 Such a methodology is not too dissimilar,
for example, to Delaware’s approach in demand-excused derivative
litigation.185 There, after a plaintiff-shareholder begins an action
for breach of fiduciary duty, defendants may establish an indepen
dent committee to investigate, and, if the committee members con
clude the action is not in the company’s best interests, they may
move to dismiss.186 However, the defendants must carry the bur
den on certain issues, such as the committee’s independence and
good faith.187 If they carry that burden, the court itself may weigh
various factors and exercise its own judgment whether to dismiss
the case or proceed to trial.188
Also, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware Su
preme Court likewise devised a framework of shifting burdens in
fiduciary duty litigation.189 Beginning with a presumption of pro
priety in director actions, the plaintiff-shareholder assumes the ini
tial burden of providing evidence of a breach of duty, which, if
proven, shifts to the director-defendants the burden of proving, to
the court’s satisfaction, the entire fairness of director conduct.190
And in the shareholder voting context, if the board acts in a way
that thwarts a shareholder vote, neither the deferential business
judgment rule nor a rule of per se invalidity is appropriate, but
rather the defendants have the burden to provide a “compelling”
corporate justification for the actions taken.191
The Wilkes court mandated as one step in its framework that
the controlling shareholders must “demonstrate a legitimate busi
ness purpose” for its action—a burden they failed to carry in that
case.192 This step likewise situates the case in a larger stream of
decisional law designed to guide and constrain judicial review.
“Business purpose,” for example, has long been required in the cor
porate tax area,193 in the hostile takeover defensive measures
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).
Id. at 778.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993).
Id. at 361.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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area,194 and in other cases where the court seeks to prohibit the
majority from unilaterally “freezing out” minority shareholders.195
These examples of multi-step frameworks and of requiring the
business purpose element demonstrate the efforts of Delaware and
other courts to do in a parallel way what the Wilkes court did: af
firm the centrality of strict fiduciary duties among shareholders in a
close corporation while bringing a principled sense of order and
guidance to the law and equity tension so as to prevent one from
vanquishing the other, while also avoiding the corresponding Donahue misbelief that the two forces had somehow been harmonized
into an easy-to-apply “rule.” Concerns about Donahue led the Su
preme Court of Delaware to reject it by reading it as just such a
“rule-based” decision—without noting the subsequent tempering of
Wilkes—which Delaware eschewed in favor of its customary “en
tire fairness” test in a self-dealing context like that in Donahue.196
Yet, in Wilkes itself, the Delaware approach would not have
worked because the controlling shareholders did not themselves
enter a self-dealing transaction with the company for which the “en
tire fairness” test was designed.197 Rather, the controlling share
holders caused the company to terminate the minority
shareholder’s prior arrangement with the business. Delaware’s
more traditional doctrinal approach seems not to capture such be
havior. And the Supreme Judicial Court itself, in subsequent cases,
has struggled to reconcile the broad fiduciary duty of Donahue with
the employment-at-will doctrine in an effort to curb a corporate law
incursion into the labor law area.198 No rule exists to make this
accommodation easy.
Law and equity will continue to subsist in an uneasy tension in
our corporate legal system because each plays a vital role in the
production of a healthy balance in that system.199 Indeed, there is a
great irony thirty-five years after the Wilkes decision and its Dona
194. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
195. Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334, 339 (N.Y. 1975).
196. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
197. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660-61 (showing no mention of the controlling
shareholders entering into a self-dealing transaction); Nixon, 625 A.2d at 1376 (explain
ing the purpose of the “entire fairness” test).
198. See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996); Blank v.
Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-06 (Mass. 1995). Professor Deborah
DeMott develops this theme more fully. Deborah A. Demott, Investing In Work:
Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497 (2011).
199. On the roles of law and equity in co-producing a healthy balance in corpo
rate jurisprudence, see Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and
Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847.
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hue-like drawing on partnership law to bolster fiduciary duties in
the close corporation. Today, in partnerships—and also in LLCs,
entities unknown in 1976—fiduciary duties supposedly may be con
tractually eliminated altogether,200 while in corporations that is for
bidden.201 Thus, while in 1975-76 Donahue and Wilkes creatively
drew on partnership law to amplify the equitable voice in close cor
porations, thirty-five years later that voice, although still remaining
in the corporation, may, by contract, now be silenced altogether in
Delaware partnerships and LLCs.202 In the initially more robust
and protective non-corporate fiduciary duty area, law today in the
leading business law state seeks to subdue equity, whereas in the
close corporation arena law and equity remain, as always, at wary
play. In Massachusetts, by contrast, thirty-five years after Wilkes a
greater harmony between corporate and non-corporate business
enterprises still endures.203
CONCLUSION
Much has changed since 1976. The city of Pittsfield, Massachu
setts has changed as it continues to adapt economically to a far dif
ferent industrial-commercial environment than that in which it
flourished for many years. The nursing home industry continues to
change as well, with the use of physical and chemical restraints—
permitted in the mid-70s—now outlawed and the development of
new procedures to ensure greater regulatory compliance.204 Springside Nursing Home, Inc. also has changed—apparently it was dis
solved long ago. Yet, one of its former properties endures as a 39
unit housing complex for homeless veterans,205 just as Springside
Nursing Home itself had earlier converted a former tuberculosis
200. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2008) (statute permitting elimina
tion of fiduciary duties in Delaware limited liability companies); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 15-103(f) (statute permitting elimination of fiduciary duties in Delaware general part
nership). Massachusetts appears not to permit elimination of fiduciary duties in part
nerships or LLCs. For a critique of Delaware’s waiver statutes on constitutional
grounds, see Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties 91 B.U. L. REV. (forth
coming 2011).
201. Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch.
2009).
202. See Johnson, supra note 200.
203. The Wilkes approach was applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court to LLCs in 2009. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 2009).
204. CHARLES W. LIDZ, LYNN FISCHER, & ROBERT M. ARNOLD, THE EROSION
IN LONG-TERM CARE 34 (1992).
205. Veterans Group Gets $2.6 M Boost, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Aug. 18, 2008
(on file with author).
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treatment center into a nursing home.206 Adaptation has occurred,
for survival sake, in many venues associated with the Wilkes case.
Fiduciary duties in the close corporation are an example of en
during equity. Shareholders in close corporations must “endure”
equity in the sense that they must put up with it and, generally,
cannot expel it a priori by means of statutes and private contracts.
Equity in the close corporation also “endures” in the sense that it
persists. It persists because in many instances—Donahue and
Wilkes being examples—it is needed to prevent lawfully-exercised
power from unjustly harming a minority shareholder. One key fea
ture in its staying power, besides its usefulness, is its remarkable
adaptability to the flux and “gray” of—and range of emotions af
fecting—human relations within a business. It opportunely takes
account of time—and its passage—in a way timeless legal rules do
not. Law assumes both a highly rational world and one in which,
while everything around it may change, a rule itself—once
adopted—will be the same tomorrow as it was yesterday, no matter
what else—even if much else—may have changed.207 In Donahue,
hoary partnership law was equitably re-fashioned to the close cor
poration setting and history was made. In Wilkes, the very force
unleashed in Donahue was itself molded yet again to give greater
weight to the law-conferred privilege of control. Wilkes tethered
equity and law together in a multi-step framework without purport
ing to elegantly and forever solve the intractable law-equity quan
dary. The decision itself has endured. It has been cited countless
times,208 appears in leading corporate law casebooks209 usually as a
coda to Donahue—and probably is taught (or at least touched on)
in most American law school corporations courses.210
206. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
207. As noted by Professor Robert Thompson, modern corporate statutes fre
quently provide remedies—for example, corporate dissolution—in cases of “oppres
sion.” Thompson, supra note 144. But those “law” provisions require that a
shareholder show oppression, which is conduct engaged in over time and is, essentially,
an equitable concept.
208. As of February 4, 2011, Wilkes had been cited 797 times. KEYCITE CITING
REFERENCES: Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com
(search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 and follow the
“Citing References” link) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
209. See, e.g., ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS A CONTEM
PORARY APPROACH 1044 (2010); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, ET AL, CORPORATIONS 363
(2010).
210. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Brodie v. Jordan and Wilkes v. Springside Nurs
ing Home, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2009/11/brodie-v-jordan-and-wilkes-v-springside-nursing
home.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
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Equity’s unruly power to upend can be irksome to those who
crave predictability and determinacy. It remains essential, however,
in a rules-based system where humility demands we admit that few
rules are so sagely written that they will always avoid injustice if
categorically applied. Equity usefully permits the taking of a sec
ond look, and, therefore, by nature it is more pliant and fluid than
rigid precepts of law. Equity’s very capacity to bring change means
that nothing need change in our legal system’s ongoing pursuit of a
just ordering within the close corporation.

